Private Equity Bankruptcy Tracker

PESP has released the Private Equity Bankruptcy Tracker

A running list of U.S. bankruptcies connected to private equity 

Updated February 12, 2025

Key Findings 

• Disproportionate Role in Bankruptcies
  • Private equity firms played a role in 56% (27 of 48 filings) of large U.S. corporate bankruptcies during 2024 (bankruptcies with liabilities of $500 million or greater at the time of filing).
  • Private equity-owned companies account for 11% (75 out of 697 filings) of all corporate bankruptcies in 2024, despite the fact that private equity accounts for 6.5% of the U.S. economy.
• Sectoral Overrepresentation
  • The impact of private equity ownership is notable in specific sectors. In healthcare, private equity-backed companies accounted for 7 of the 8 largest bankruptcies.
  • Private-equity-backed companies account for a quarter of all consumer discretionary bankruptcies, including brands like 99 Cents Only Stores, Red Lobster, and Party City.
• Worker and Community Impacts
  • Large bankruptcies, which are overrepresented among private equity-owned companies, disproportionately affect workers and local economies.
  • Private equity-related bankruptcies in 2024 have resulted in at least 65,850 layoffs across the country.
  • Private equity-backed companies account for 21% of all healthcare bankruptcies in 2024. These bankruptcies are especially devastating to consumers and may leave people without access to essential care.
• Distressed Exchanges
  • In addition to bankruptcy filings, private equity-owned companies are also defaulting and restructuring out of court through distressed exchanges.
  • In 2024 there were at least 24 distressed exchanges at private equity-owned companies. This is likely an undercount, as distressed exchanges do not have to be publicly reported.
• Investor Outcomes
  • Despite their role in precipitating bankruptcies, private equity firms often emerge financially unscathed, profiting from management fees and dividends.
• Need for Regulatory Oversight and Investor Responsibility
  • Investors, including public pension funds, are increasingly adopting policies to mitigate labor and financial risks. The disproportionate role of private equity in bankruptcies underscores the need for enhanced regulation and transparency.

Introduction

Private equity has played a disproportionately large role in U.S. bankruptcies in 2024, with startling economic implications. Although private equity accounts for 6.5% of the U.S. economy according to the primary lobby group for the industry, it was responsible for 56% of the largest bankruptcies (those involving liabilities exceeding $500 million at the time of filing).^[1] Private equity-owned companies account for 11% of all bankruptcies in 2024,^[2] with a clear overrepresentation in large bankruptcies.

Large bankruptcies are particularly concerning as those tend to have an outsized impact on workers and consumers. Bankruptcies by private equity-owned companies in 2024 directly resulted in at least 65,850 layoffs across the country. In addition, private equity was overrepresented in healthcare bankruptcies, accounting for 7 of the 8 largest healthcare-related bankruptcies of the year, and 21% of all healthcare bankruptcies.

This trend raises pressing questions about the long-term consequences of private equity’s growing footprint in nearly every sector of the economy.

The private equity model prefers short-term profits and rapid value extraction over the long-term stability of the companies in their portfolios. Private equity firms have demonstrated overreliance on cost-cutting measures and aggressive financial policies that have limited long-term prospects. Focusing on immediate financial gains can lead to significant mismanagement and economic instability, contributing to higher bankruptcy rates among private equity-owned firms.

A critical driver of this instability is the widespread use of leveraged buyouts. A leveraged buyout is a strategy in which a private equity firm finances its acquisition of a company using debt secured by the company it is acquiring rather than using its capital or taking on the debt itself. This tactic saddles private equity-owned companies with substantial debt, often draining resources that could otherwise be invested in innovation, workforce development, or adapting to market changes. Instead, firms under private equity ownership must channel much of their revenue toward servicing this debt, leaving them vulnerable to financial distress and bankruptcy.

More bankruptcies and defaults are projected for 2025, and private equity will likely be a key driver for many of them. Credit ratings agency Moody’s Investors Service rates companies based on their probability of default. Of Moodys’ list of most speculative companies (probability of default rating of B3 negative and lower), private equity portfolio companies represented 73% as of October 2024 (183 out of 240 B3 negative and lower companies were private equity-backed).^[3]

In fact, more private equity bankruptcies have already been announced in 2025. Safety net hospital chain Prospect Medical Holdings filed for bankruptcy on January 11 with debts of more than $400 million.^[4] Its former private equity owner, Leonard Green & Partners had siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars in debt-funded dividends throughout its ownership, leaving the hospitals and the communities they serve holding the bag.^[5]

Private equity’s expansion into nearly every sector of the U.S. economy has far-reaching consequences. The heightened risk of bankruptcy threatens job security for workers, disrupts services for consumers, and creates ripple effects across local economies. Private equity’s growing presence raises questions about the sustainability of this financial model and its long-term impact on the broader economy. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policymakers, industry stakeholders, and the public as they grapple with an increasingly privatized landscape.

Bankruptcy Tracker

• Private equity-backed companies represented 75 out of 697 bankruptcies in 2024, 11% of all corporate bankruptcies.
• Private equity-backed companies represented 27 of 48 bankruptcies with over $500 million in liabilities at the filings, 56% of large bankruptcies.
• Private equity-backed companies represented 18 of 35 bankruptcies with over $1 billion in liabilities, 54% of the largest bankruptcies.
• Private equity-related bankruptcies in 2024 have resulted in at least 65,850 layoffs.

Bankruptcies with over $500 million in liabilities

All U.S. corporate bankruptcies

This data is relatively consistent with other recent data on private equity bankruptcies. S&P identified 110 private equity and venture capital-backed bankruptcies in 2024. S&P’s estimate is larger than PESP’s due to the decision to include both private equity and venture capital (“currently has a private equity or venture capital firm as its financial parent,” per S&P).^[6]

Methods

Bankruptcies were compiled using S&P Global Intelligence data and news searches. Bankruptcies include public companies or private companies with public debt with a minimum of $2 million in assets or liabilities at the time of filing, in addition to private companies with at least $10 million in assets or liabilities. Private equity ownership was determined through a combination of private equity firms’ online portfolio listings, Pitchbook, press releases, bankruptcy filings, and SEC filings. The tracker includes all bankruptcies where a private equity firm had a controlling (over 50%) stake in a company at the time of bankruptcy or since 2020.

Layoffs were determined from online news searches, WARN Act filings, and press releases.^[7]

For the purposes of this report, PESP has opted to use S&P’s sectoral classifications for the listed companies, derived from its Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). S&P categorizes companies using GICS based on what S&P deems is a company’s primary business activity.^[8] The classifications may not capture the full scope of these companies’ operations.

The Human Cost of Private Equity Bankruptcies

Worker impacts and mass layoffs

Despite private equity firms being responsible for a disproportionate number of bankruptcies, the firms are not the ones most financially impacted by the outcomes of these bankruptcies. While not all restructuring includes store closures and mass layoffs, the workers at these portfolio companies often have to pay the price for mismanagement and risky debt practices.

For 2024 alone, private equity-related bankruptcies have resulted in at least 65,850 layoffs. This is likely a significant undercount as it does not include unreported layoffs or closures, layoffs that occurred in the years leading up to a bankruptcy filing, layoffs outside the United States, and layoffs across supply chains.

Several examples illustrate how private equity ownership and its debt-driven practices have contributed to mass layoffs and local economic distress:

In April 2024, 99 Cents Only Stores announced that it was filing for bankruptcy and liquidating all stores – this meant closing 371 stores and laying off its entire workforce of 10,800 people.^[9] Private equity firm Ares Management and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board acquired 99 Cents Only Stores through a leveraged buyout in 2012. The private equity firm and pension fund bought the company for $1.6 billion but used approximately $775 million in debt loaded onto the company to finance their acquisition.^[10] This insolvency not only led to the company’s collapse but put 10,800 people out of work.

These mass layoffs can have devastating effects on the workers who relied on their paychecks. In the case of San Diego-based Rubio’s Coastal Grill, which filed for bankruptcy in June, employees not only lost their jobs but were also reportedly unable to cash in their final checks.^[11] Rubio’s, which was acquired by the private equity firm Mill Road Capital in 2010, closed 48 stores and laid off an estimated 1,100 employees.^[12][13][14] The laid-off employees who could not cash their final check reportedly were required to file a claim with the bankruptcy court in Delaware, where Rubio’s filed for bankruptcy, adding to their financial uncertainty.^[15]

In other private equity-related bankruptcy cases, it is difficult to calculate the full impact of the restructuring on employees because the layoffs occur before the bankruptcy is filed.  Primary care chain Cano Health, which was acquired by the private equity firm InTandem Capital Partners in 2017,^[16] announced its bankruptcy in February 2024.^[17] In 2023, approximately six months before the filing, Cano Health laid off 700 employees, citing insufficient liquidity.^[18] Because these layoffs occurred prior to the bankruptcy filing, we did not include them in the layoff tally in this report.

The repercussions of these bankruptcies extend far beyond the affected companies, impacting employees, suppliers, and local economies. Job losses devastate local communities and reverberate throughout the national economy as suppliers and small businesses feel the downstream effects. Bankruptcies and store closures trigger supplier layoffs, compounding the job losses. A 2019 study by the Economic Policy Institute estimated that in the retail sector, for example, when 100 direct jobs are lost, an additional 122 indirect jobs are also lost, magnifying the economic impact.^[19]

Bankruptcy impacts on consumer needs and healthcare access

In addition to the hardship the bankruptcies can cause workers, closures can also harm consumers and the public. In certain instances, this can be the loss of certain products that consumers prefer or rely on. In healthcare, the consequences can be life-altering. Bankruptcy-driven closures or cost-cutting measures leave patients without reliable access to care, disrupting treatment plans and jeopardizing lives.

Private equity played an outsized role in bankruptcies in both the consumer discretionary and consumer staples industries. Consumer discretionary goods are those that are not essential, such as luxury items, new vehicles, vacations, fast food, furniture, and appliances. Consumer staples are the basics that consumers cannot forgo, even during an economic downturn, such as groceries, school uniforms, and medication. In both instances, consumers feel the loss of the products or services they count on. This loss is even more devastating in critical sectors like healthcare, where people may be left without access to essential services.

One major healthcare system bankruptcy is Steward Health Care, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May with over $9 billion in liabilities.  Steward Health Care is a multi-state hospital system that was owned by private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management from 2010 to 2020.^[20]

Since 2018, Steward has closed six hospitals in the US, resulting in the layoffs of at least 2,650 workers and reduced access to care for the communities they served. Steward has also cut important service lines, such as obstetrics, behavioral health, and cancer care, among others. Two of the hospital closures happened in 2024 when the health system was on the eve of bankruptcy.^[21]   At the time of bankruptcy, Steward owed nearly $300 million in unpaid compensation to physicians and other staffers.^[22]

Cerberus not only exited its investment before facing the consequences of the bankruptcy it helped set in motion but also cashed in dividends while hospitals were neglected, staff went unpaid, and patients suffered.^[23] Cerberus reportedly made $800 million in the decade it owned Steward, and around the time of Cerberus’ exit, Steward paid its ownership an $111 million dividend.^[24]

See PESP’s June 2024 report on Steward Health Care: “The Pillaging of Steward Health Care: How a private equity firm and hospital landlord contributed to Steward’s Bankruptcy”

Bankruptcies in healthcare can also have ripple effects outside of the direct impacts on a closed hospital. When hospitals close, nearby hospitals often bear the brunt of increased patient loads. This is hardest felt in rural communities.^[25] The Chief Medical Officer at a hospital in Massachusetts attributes the recent rise in patient visits to their emergency department to the closure of a nearby Steward Health Hospital that closed as part of its bankruptcy.^[26]

Another massive healthcare bankruptcy is Wellpath Holdings, a leading healthcare provider in jails and prisons, which filed for bankruptcy in November. Wellpath is owned by H.I.G Capital, which created the company in 2018 by combining two other correctional healthcare companies.^[27] H.I.G.’s mismanagement of Wellpath, which led to its bankruptcy, extends past the usual private equity playbook. Prior to bankruptcy, Wellpath had its credit rating downgraded, faced an executive bribery scandal, and drew attention for conditions that endangered and harmed patients under its care. ^[28][29][30]

In addition to taking on a large debt load, under H.I.G. Capital ownership, the company had several scandals that may have contributed to its collapse. At one California facility, the U.S. Department of Justice’s findings led it to conclude that there was reasonable cause to conclude that “medical care at the jail is inadequate in violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights.”^[31] Among other issues, the Justice Department describes medication mismanagement, including delayed medication or not provided at all; wrong dosages or ineffective combinations of medications; and psychiatric staff mismanagement.^[32] Additionally, in 2022, Wellpath founder Gerard Boyle was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison after being charged with federal bribery charges.^[33]

Wellpath’s bankruptcy raises concerns about private equity firms’ ability to use bankruptcy to skirt obligations to settlements and lawsuits over care and malpractice. Wellpath is named in 1,000 federal lawsuits, pending and closed, across the United States and accused of contributing to at least 70 deaths.^[34] In a December 2024 letter to Wellpath and H.I.G. Capital, Senator Elizabeth Warren  (D-MA) urged the company to ensure fair payouts to creditors and claimants: “Our bankruptcy system provides companies with the opportunity for a fresh start. Wellpath must not abuse that system to avoid paying what it owes to incarcerated patients with credible claims against it.”^[35]

See PESP’s full report on H.I.G’s ownership of Wellpath —“Private Equity Firms Rebrand Prison Healthcare Companies, But Care Issues Continue.”

Investor Outcomes in Bankruptcy Cases

Private equity firms have an outsized role in bankruptcies but can sometimes profit despite the collapse or restructuring of the firms in their portfolios. For example, private equity owners can exit their investments before bankruptcy despite creating the conditions for bankruptcy. Golden Gate Capital, for example, exited Red Lobster before its bankruptcy despite creating an unsustainable capital structure that ultimately contributed to its downfall. Golden Gate added substantial debt to Red Lobster over the course of its ownership, but Golden Gate was no longer on the hook for that debt once it sold its stake in the company in 2020.^[36]

Private equity firms can also profit in the face of bankruptcy through fees the firms charge their investors. Private equity firms do not primarily invest their own capital. Instead, firms pool funds from institutional investors such as pension funds, university endowments, and insurance companies. Private equity firms charge these institutional investors a fee for investing and pocket some of the profits of the investments. Typically, private equity firms make 2% of the money under management from fees alone and take 20% of the profits from each fund they run.^[37] This means that even funds that fail to produce large returns for investors result in gains for the private equity firm.

Distressed Exchanges as a Response to Private Equity Debt Burdens

In addition to bankruptcy, distressed exchanges are an out-of-court mechanism private equity-owned companies can use while experiencing debt loads and liquidity crises. While they allow companies to circumvent a formal bankruptcy process, distressed exchanges often lead to outcomes strikingly similar to those seen in bankruptcies, affecting creditors, workers, and consumers in profound ways.

A distressed exchange is a type of financial restructuring in which a company negotiates with its creditors to swap existing debt for new debt or equity, often at terms that are less favorable to the creditors. These exchanges aim to reduce the company’s debt burden and extend its repayment timeline without undergoing formal bankruptcy proceedings, though in many cases serve to merely delay an eventual bankruptcy. While they avoid the court system, distressed exchanges can have consequences that resemble those of bankruptcy for both creditors and the company’s workforce.^[38] This restructuring can also have less public scrutiny than a bankruptcy, as companies do not have the same disclosure requirements as they would in a bankruptcy.^[39]

In the past year, there have been at least 24 distressed exchanges at private equity-owned companies.  This is likely an undercount, as distressed exchanges do not have to be publicly reported.

A handful of private equity firms had multiple companies execute distressed exchanges in 2024, including Apollo Global Management (CareerBuilder, BrightSpeed, Anuvu), Platinum Equity (Aventiv, USS), and Clearlake Capital (Spring Windows, FinThrive).^[40] Some of these deals occurred at companies providing essential services, such as Blackstone-owned TeamHealth, a physician staffing company that employs 14,000 clinicians at approximately 1,000 hospitals and other healthcare facilities.^[41] This debt practice is especially troubling in the healthcare sector, where such financial maneuvers risk not only job losses for clinicians but also disruptions in patient care.

Even after distressed exchanges, companies may succumb to bankruptcy due to large debt burdens. According to a 2021 S&P report, after distressed exchanges, further defaults occur 37% of the time.^[42] The risks associated with distressed exchanges mirror those associated with bankruptcies. In both instances, a company’s obligations to creditors take precedence over long-term investments.

Implications of Private Equity Bankruptcies

Despite their role in fueling bankruptcies, private equity firms often escape the full consequences of business failure. Management fees and debt-enabled financial structures ensure profitability for firms, even as the companies they own falter.

The influence of private equity is vast and growing. Private equity firms now operate in nearly every sector of the economy, from retail and healthcare to essential services. Projections indicate that private equity assets under management will grow from $540.72 billion in 2024 to $1.2 trillion by 2033—well over double its current footprint.^[43] This growth raises critical concerns: if private equity bankruptcies already account for a disproportionate share of financial collapses, this trend could accelerate in the coming decade.

Private equity’s outsized role in bankruptcies should concern investors considering investing or renewing investments in private equity. Private equity firms charge a steep price to invest on the promise that the returns of private equity investments will largely outperform public markets.

The private equity tendency to focus on short-term gain rather than on longevity and growth can not only lead to bankruptcy but may indicate that long-term investments in private equity are not as lucrative as investors were promised. Between 2010 and 2020, public pension funds’ private equity investments performed worse than the S&P 500 in the same time frame.^[44]

Investors who seek to mitigate adverse impacts to workers, financial risks, and reputational damage should adopt specific labor standards across their private equity portfolios. The largest public pension fund in the United States, the $500 billion California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), began implementing its policy to address subpar labor practices at some of its asset managers’ portfolio companies in early 2024. In April 2024, the New York State Common Retirement Fund adopted a Responsible Workforce Management Policy and Principles for its private equity investments. Investment policies offer limited partners an important tool to address the risks associated with private equity investments.

See PESP’s Private Equity Labor Rights Platform.

See North America’s Building Trades Unions Principles of Responsible Workforce Management

Bankruptcies are a key bellwether signaling the broader risks associated with private equity investments. For investors and the public alike, bankruptcy trends mark a critical moment and highlight the need for regulation and transparency in the industry.

Citations

^[1]“Private Equity’s Impact Across America.” American Investment Council. November 6, 2024. https://www.investmentcouncil.org/private-equitys-impact-across-america/#:~:text=Driving%20$1.7%20Trillion%20in%20Economic,of%20GDP%20for%20that%20year. ; “Economic Contribution of the US Private Equity Sector in 2020.” American Investment Council; EY, May 1, 2021. https://www.investmentcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/ey-aic-pe-economic-contribution-report-final-05-13-2021.pdf

^[2] This analysis includes all U.S. corporate bankruptcy filings with public companies or private companies with public debt with a minimum of $2 million in assets or liabilities at the time of filing, in addition to private companies with at least $10 million in assets or liabilities.

^[3] Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s B3 Negative and Lower Corporate Ratings List – US: Stubbornly elevated B3N List reflects LBO struggles,” October 21, 2024. Pg. 3.

^[4]https://www.cbsnews.com/news/prospect-medical-holdings-bankruptcy-private-equity/

^[5] See our 2022 report: “How Private Equity Raided Safety Net Hospitals and Left Communities Holding the Bag,” Private Equity Stakeholder Project, November 29, 2022. https://pestakeholder.org/reports/how-private-equity-raided-safety-net-hospitals-and-left-communities-holding-the-bag/

^[6] Vidal, Karl Angelo, and Annie Sabater. “PE-backed Company Bankruptcies in US Reach Record High in 2024.” S&P Global. January 9, 2025. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/pe-backed-company-bankruptcies-in-us-reach-record-high-in-2024-87023731.

^[7] Some layoffs resulting from 2024 bankruptcies are planned but have not yet occurred. For example, American Freight, a subsidiary of Franchise Group, has announced that it is liquidating and closing all stores by March 1, 2025 as part of the restructuring process. According to Franchise Group bankruptcy filings, American Freight has about 3,000 employees. These anticipated layoffs are included in the final tally.

^[8] S&P Global, “GICS: Global Industry Classification Standard.” Accessed January 30, 2025. https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/landing/topic/gics/

^[9] Case 24-10719-JKS Doc 1043, NUMBER HOLDINGS, INC. et al, Debtors Motion for Entry of an Order, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Filed 07/19/24 https://cases.ra.kroll.com/99only/Home-DownloadPDF?id1=MjU5MjM0Nw==&id2=-1 pg. 3.

^[10]Young, Vicki M. “Shrink Contributed to 99 Cents’ Demise, And So Did An LBO.” Sourcing Journal. April 12, 2024. https://sourcingjournal.com/topics/retail/99-cents-only-lbo-shrink-operating-costs-declining-sales-bankruptcy-dollar-tree-family-dollar-tractor-supply-504687/.;  $775 million in debt used for the 99 Cents LBO was comprised of $525 million senior secured term loan and $250 million senior unsecured notes. See: “Moody’s assigns first time ratings to 99¢ Only Stores, CFR at B2,,” Moody’s Investors Service, December 5, 2011. https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-first-time-ratings-to-99-Only-Stores-CFR-Rating-Action–PR_232212

^[11]Sowards, Hunter. “Rubio’s Coastal Grill Employees Can’t Cash Final Paycheck after Closures.” CBS News Business. June 7, 2024. https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/rubios-coastal-grill-employees-cant-cash-final-paycheck-after-closures/.

^[12] Jennings, Lisa. “Rubio’s to Be Sold to Mill Road for $91M.” Nation’s Restaurant News. May 10, 2010. https://www.nrn.com/corporate/rubios-be-sold-mill-road-91m.

^[13] Sternfield, Marc. “Rubio’s Closing 48 Locations Due to ‘Rising Cost of Doing Business’.” Yahoo! Finance. June 3, 2024. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/rubio-closing-48-locations-due-185647144.html

^[14] In March 2024 Rubio’s said in a press release that it had “over 3,000 employees” and operated “over 140 restaurants.”

In the bankruptcy filings submitted three months later, Rubio’s wrote: “As of the Petition Date, the Debtors operated 86 restaurants at leased locations in California, Arizona, and Nevada, and employ more than 1,900 individuals at their restaurants and corporate offices in Carlsbad, California.” (see page 3).

Holzman, Lauren. “Pro Surfers, the Colapinto Brothers, Partner With Rubio’S Coastal Grill.” BusinessWire. March 4, 2024. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240304712085/en/Pro-Surfers-the-Colapinto-Brothers-Partner-With-Rubio%E2%80%99s-Coastal-Grill.; Case 24-11164-CTG Doc 18, MRRC HOLD CO. et al, DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS D. RUBIN IN SUPPORT OF CHAPTER 11 PETITIONS AND FIRST DAY PLEADINGS, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, (page 3) Filed 06/5/24. https://cases.stretto.com/public/X333/12883/PLEADINGS/1288306062480000000016.pdf

^[15]Sowards, Hunter. “Rubio’s Coastal Grill Employees Can’t Cash Final Paycheck after Closures.” CBS News Business. June 7, 2024. https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/rubios-coastal-grill-employees-cant-cash-final-paycheck-after-closures/.

^[16] “Press Release: CANO HEALTH ACQUISITION.” InTandem Capital Partners. January 17, 2017. https://intandemcapital.com/news-and-videos/cano-health-acquisition/.

^[17]“NYSE to Commence Delisting Proceedings Against Cano Health, Inc. (CANO).” BusinessWire. February 5, 2024. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240205283403/en/NYSE-to-Commence-Delisting-Proceedings-Against-Cano-Health-Inc.-CANO.

^[18]Landi, Heather. “Primary Care Business Cano Health Lays off 700 Employees, now Exploring Sale as Its Cash Dwindles.” Fierce Healthcare. August 10, 2023. https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/providers/primary-care-business-cano-health-exploring-sale-its-cash-dwindles-plans-exit-several.

^[19] Josh Bivens, “Updated employment multipliers for the U.S. economy,” Economic Policy Institute, January 23, 2019, https://www.epi.org/publication/updated-employment-multipliers-for-the-u-s-economy/  

^[20] Ashley, Madeline. “Steward Plans Sale of All Hospitals, Reports $9B in Debt.” Becker’s Hospital Review, May 7, 2024. https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/steward-plans-sale-of-all-hospitals-reports-9b-in-debt.html ; Vogel, Susanna. “Steward’s Bankruptcy Documents Reveal Sprawling Debt, Planned Hospital Fire Sale.” Healthcare Dive, May 7, 2024. https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/stewards-bankruptcy-documents-reveal-sprawling-debt-planned-hospital-fire/715245/

^[21]Bugbee, Mary. “The Pillaging of Steward Health Care.” Private Equity Stakeholder Project. June 26, 2024. https://pestakeholder.org/reports/the-pillaging-of-steward-health-care/.

^[22] Tkacik, Maureen. “A Hospital Heist Seeks Protection in the Ponzi-Friendliest Court in America.” The American Prospect, May 6, 2024. https://prospect.org/api/content/a989ab44-0c1c-11ef-8071-12163087a831/

^[23]Willmer, Sabrina. “Cerberus Quadruples Money After Unusual Exit From Hospital Giant.” Bloomberg. May 27, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-27/cerberus-quadruples-money-after-unusual-exit-from-hospital-giant?embedded-checkout=true., Sharife, Khadija. “How Private Equity and an Ambitious Landlord Put Steward Health Care on Life Support.” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. October 9, 2024. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/how-private-equity-and-an-ambitious-landlord-put-steward-healthcare-on-life-support; Ostriker, Rebecca, and Catherine Carlock. “House of Cards: How a Real Estate Firm and Steward Health Care Grew in Tandem, in Part by Keeping Steward’S Shaky Finances Secret.” Boston Herald. October 8, 2024. https://apps.bostonglobe.com/metro/investigations/spotlight/2024/09/steward-hospitals/steward-mpt/.

^[24] Sabrina Willmer. “Cerberus Quadruples Money After Unusual Exit From Hospital Giant.” Bloomberg.Com, May 27, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-27/cerberus-quadruples-money-after-unusual-exit-from-hospital-giant; Weil, Jonathan. “The Private-Equity Deal That Flattened a Hospital Chain and Its Landlord.” WSJ, May 7, 2024, sec. Markets. https://www.wsj.com/finance/the-private-equity-deal-that-flattened-a-hospital-chain-and-its-landlord-3096747d

^[25] Muoio, Dave. “Rural Hospital Closures Have Spillover Effects for Other Nearby Facilities, Researchers Warn.” Fierce Healthcare. December 15, 2022. https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/providers/rural-hospital-closures-have-spillover-effects-other-nearby-facilities-researchers-warn.

^[26]Bienick, David. “Massachusetts Emergency Rooms near Closed Steward Hospitals See More Patients.” WCVB. October 24, 2024. https://www.wcvb.com/article/emergency-rooms-impact-closed-steward-hospitals-massachusetts/62709364.

^[27] “H.I.G. Capital – Correct Care Solutions and Correctional Medical Group Companies Join Forces to Deliver Best-in-Class Healthcare,” H.I.G. Capital, October 1, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20221201100235/https://higcapital.com/news/release/correct-care-solutions-and-correctional-medical-group-companies-join-forces-to-deliver-best-in-class-healthcare

^[28] Diebler, Jack, and David Peknay. “WellPath Holdings Inc. Rating Lowered To ‘CCC’ As Maturities Approach And Removed From CreditWatch; Outlook Negative.” S&P Global. September 20, 2024. https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/3254325.

^[29] “CEO Sentenced for Bribing Former Norfolk Sheriff.” United States Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Virginia. February 25, 2022. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/ceo-sentenced-bribing-former-norfolk-sheriff-0#:~:text=According%20to%20court%20documents%2C%20Gerard,services%20to%20people%20in%20jail.

^[30] Civil Rights Division. “Investigation of the San Luis Obispo County Jail.” page 1-3, U.S. Department of Justice, August 31, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/press-release/file/1429106/download

^[31] Civil Rights Division. “Investigation of the San Luis Obispo County Jail.” page 5, U.S. Department of Justice, August 31, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/press-release/file/1429106/download

^[32] Civil Rights Division. “Investigation of the San Luis Obispo County Jail.” page 1-3, U.S. Department of Justice, August 31, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/press-release/file/1429106/download

^[33] “CEO Sentenced for Bribing Former Norfolk Sheriff.” United States Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Virginia. February 25, 2022. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/ceo-sentenced-bribing-former-norfolk-sheriff-0#:~:text=According%20to%20court%20documents%2C%20Gerard,services%20to%20people%20in%20jail.

^[34] Coin, Julia. “Medical Company’s Bankruptcy Could Hinder Jail Death Lawsuits in Charlotte.” The Charlotte Observer. November 18, 2024. https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article295565834.html.

^[35]US Senator Elizabeth Warren. “Wellpath Bankruptcy Letter.” United States Senate. December 19, 2024. https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wellpath_bankruptcy_letter.pdf. Pg. 4.

^[36] Dabos, Valentina. “Don’t Blame the Shrimp: How Private Equity Is Bankrupting America.” Private Equity Stakeholder Project. June 20, 2024. https://pestakeholder.org/news/dont-blame-the-shrimp-how-private-equity-is-bankrupting-america/.

^[37] Blasdel, Alex. “Slash and Burn: Is Private Equity Out of Control?” The Guardian. October 10, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/oct/10/slash-and-burn-is-private-equity-out-of-control.

^[38] Gelfand, Brian G. “Distressed Exchange.” TCW. July 12, 2020. https://www.tcw.com/Insights/2020/2020-07-15-HY-Update?sc_lang=en.

^[39] “Navigating Debt Repurchases: What You Need to Know.” Latham & Watkins. October 6, 2022. https://www.lw.com/people/admin/upload/SiteAttachments/Alert%203015.pdf.

^[40] Private Equity Stakeholder Project assembled list of 2024 distressed exchanges based on credit ratings announced by Moody’s Investors Service. List assembled as of January 15, 2025. See here: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mxXYa3MJwnpPschRo0kQfdtqq8hpmP7IdqKhDEuzMVY/edit?usp=sharing  ; “Moody’s Ratings upgrades Team Health’s CFR to Caa3 from Ca; appends limited default (LD) to its PDR; outlook stable,” Moody’s Investors Service, August 27, 2024. https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Ratings-upgrades-Team-Healths-CFR-to-Caa3-from-Ca-Rating-Action–PR_494861

^[41] “Moody’s Ratings upgrades Team Health’s CFR to Caa3 from Ca; appends limited default (LD) to its PDR; outlook stable,” Moody’s Investors Service, August 27, 2024. https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Ratings-upgrades-Team-Healths-CFR-to-Caa3-from-Ca-Rating-Action–PR_494861

^[42] “Default, Transition, and Recovery: Out-Of-Court Restructurings May Lead To Repeat Defaults Among Distressed U.S. And Canadian Corporates.” S&P Global. May 11, 2021. https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/210511-default-transition-and-recovery-out-of-court-restructurings-may-lead-to-repeat-defaults-among-distressed-u-11939647.

^[43] Zotig, Shivani. “Private Equity Market Size, Share, and Trends 2024 to 2033.” Precedence Research. June 24, 2024.https://www.precedenceresearch.com/private-equity-market.

^[44]Blasdel, Alex. “Slash and Burn: Is Private Equity Out of Control?” The Guardian. October 10, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/oct/10/slash-and-burn-is-private-equity-out-of-control.